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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS;
BANKRUPTCY-STAY OF DISCHARGE-PROPER ONLY WHERE CRED-
ITOR'S'RIGHT To EXEMPT PROPERTY ACQUIRED By WAIVER OR CON-
TRAcT-.Harris v. Hoffman, 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967)-Mr. and
Mrs. Ha rrig executed a promissory note in favor of Harry Hoffman
on January 1, 1957, in the amount of 8,000 dollars. More than a year
later the debtors purchased a home in Carroll, Iowa, valued by the
trustee in bankruptcy at 12,000 dollars. Creditor Hoffman com-
menced suit on the note in the District Court of Iowa, which pro-
ceeding was stayed on December 17, 1965, the day following the
Harrises' petition and adjudication in bankruptcy. Their home was
set aside as exempt property by the trustee. Hoffman requested the
bankruptcy court to withhold final discharge of the bankrupts so he
might obtain judgment in the state court, and become secured by a
lien on the bankrupts' exempt homestead. The request was based
upon Hoffman's claim that the property was not exempt to him
under Iowa law, since the debt pre-dated the acquisition of the
property.
Hoffman's request was denied by the referee on three grounds.1
First, no remedy is available to Hoffman in an Iowa court, as evi-
denced by the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Bracewell v.
Hughes.2 Second, prior statements of the Eighth Circuit noting the
propriety of such stays were dictum." Third, the cases where stays
were granted
involved liens or rights created by waiver or contract and which
were in existence at the time the bankruptcy proceedings were
commenced.4
Hoffman's claim was not created by waiver or contract as defined
by those cases.
Hoffman appealed to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa" which ordered final dis-
charge be withheld for a reasonable time on the authority of Duffy
1 Record at 8, Harris v. Hoffman, 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
2 214 Iowa 241, 242 N.W. 66 (1932). For a thorough analysis of this case and
the related case of McMains v. Cunningham, 214 Iowa 300, 242 N.W. 106 (1932), see
Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IoVA L. REV. 445, 469 n. 117
(1960).
3 Duffy v. Tegeler, 19 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1927); Ingram v. Wilson, 125 F. 913 (8th
Cir. 1903).
4 Record at 10, Harris v. Hoffman, 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
5 Id. at 13.
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v. Tegeler.6 The court held Bracewell v. Hughes7 provided no
equitable remedy existed in Iowa courts for the creditor of a bank-
rupt. But the plaintiff was not precluded from a remedy at law.s
In Harris v. Hoffman9 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court, refusing the stay on both state
and federal grounds. The court held the Iowa Supreme Court had
precluded any state remedy,10 and, even if a state remedy existed,
stays are proper under Lockwood v. Exchange Bank" only where
the right claimed in the exempt property was acquired by waiver
or contract.
The court of appeals decision alters the rights of a large class
of creditors. State exemption schemes often provide that certain
classes of creditors may obtain execution on generally exempt prop-
erty.12 Previous federal court decisions have recognized the privileged
status of those creditors.' 3 Harris v. Hoffman'1 affects the rights of
creditors falling within state exceptions to state exemptions. It pre-
vents those creditors from reaching the exempt property of a bank-
rupt unless they hold waiver or contract claims. Since they cannot
reach exempt property they are confined to their distributive share
of the bankrupt's estate. The often elaborate exemption schemes
are reduced to their general statements for bankruptcy purposes.
The exceptions are in effect eliminated.
In determining whether such a result is dictated by the Bank-
ruptcy Act 15 and its judicial constructions, it is necessary to analyze
i 19 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1927).
7 214 Iowa 241, 242 NA. 66 (1932).
8 Record at 14, Harris v. Hoffman, 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
9 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
10 Bracewell v. Hughes, 214 Iowa 241, 242 N.V. 66 (1932).
11 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
12 E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 561.21 (1946), invoked by Hoffman in the principal
case, provides:
The homestead may be sold to satisfy debts of each of the following dasses:
1. Those contracted prior to its acquisition, but then only to satisfy a de-
fidency remaining after exhausting the other property of the debtor, liable
to execution.
13 In re Sokatch, 208 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); In re Nixon, 34 F.2d
667, 670 (D. Okla. 1929); In re J. E. Maynard & Co., 183 F. 823, 826 (D. Ga. 1910);
In re Castleberry, 143 F. 1018, 1020 (D. Ga. 1905); In re Brumbaugh, 128 F. 971, 974
(D. Pa. 1904). See Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931) and cases died
note 3 supra.
'4 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
15 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964). Following citations will be to sections of Mr. LAur,
1966 COLER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRuurcY Acr [hereinafter cited as BAUIRUPTCY
Acr]. Each section therein shows the equivalent section in the United States Code.
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the rights of the three classes of claimants. competing for the exempt
property: the bankrupt, the individual creditors and the trustee as
representative of the general creditors. The bankrupt may have cer-
tain property set off to him as exempt from the claims of general
creditors. 16 He may also have liens on the exempt property dis-
charged which were obtained by judicial proceedings within four
months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.'7 The in-
dividual creditor may have the bankrupt's final discharge withheld
under proper circumstances.18 This enables the creditor to assert
his claim in a state court and become secured by obtaining a lien
on the exempt property. The trustee may have certain liens pre-
served for the benefit of general creditors.19 He is subrogated to the
lienholder's right and may obtain execution upon exempt property,
including the proceeds in the estate for distribution to the general
creditors. This increases the value of the estate and assures each
general creditor will realize a greater proportion of his claim.
Each- right enhances the position of its holder. But in certain
situations they conflict. Before the conflicts are examined, a gen-
eral survey of the rules surrounding each of the rights is necessary.
The Bankruptcy Act does not affect the allowance to bankrupts
of state exemptions.20 Such exemptions vary widely in form and
maximum amount. Property may be exempt from judicial sale21 or
from liens obtained through legal proceedings.22 Exemptions com-
monly include the homestead, tools of trade, household goods and
wearing apparel.23 There are classes of creditors and claimants to
whom property is often not exempt under state law. These include
tort24 and wage 5 claimants, purchase money26 and tax27 creditors
16 BANKRuTcy Aar §§ 6, 47a (6).
17 Id. at § 67a (3).
18 Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 US. 294, 300-01 (1903) .
19 B~ANuprcy Acr § 67a (3).
20 Id. at § 6.
21 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.16 (1946), the homestead statute in the principal
case.
22 E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.4031 (1962).
23 See Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YmA L.J.
1459, 1463-69 (1959) for a collection of various provisions in state exemption statute.
See also Joslin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355
(1959).
24 In re Brumbaugh, 128 F. 971, 972 (D. Pa. 1904).
25..E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 52, §§ 16, 18 (Smith-Hurd 1967); Oiuo REV. CoDE
ANN. § 2329.72 (Page 1953).
26 E.g., FLA. CONsr, art. X, § 1 (1885).
27 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 5 (1955).
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and creditors whose claims existed prior to acquisition of the prop-
erty.
28
In bankruptcy proceedings the petition is followed within five
days by the bankrupt's claim of exemptions.2 The trustee is re-
quired to
set apart the bankrupts' exemptions allowed by law, if claimed,
and report the items and estimated value thereof to the courts
as soon as practicable .... 30
Title to exempt property remains in the bankrupt.3 1 The property
passes to the trustee as a part of the bankrupt's estate for purposes
of segregation, identification and appraisal.32 Being set off to the
bankrupt as exempt does not free the property from liens,38 nor
will a discharge in bankruptcy remove them.34 The bankruptcy
court may not determine claims to exempt property nor grant exe-
cution of existing liens thereon.3 5 Creditors must assert in a state
court their claims to property which the trustee has set off as
exempt.36 The bankrupt may obtain an order from the bankruptcy
court to stay a state proceeding any time prior to his discharge.3 T
Thus the bankruptcy court determines which creditors may pro-
ceed to judgment during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings.
Creditors within exceptions to the bankrupt's exemption may hold
claims which will be discharged in bankruptcy.38 When they hold
dischargable claims, 9 their specially recognized status with respect
28 Eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.21 (1946) reprinted supra note 12.
29 BANKRUPTcY Acr § 7a (8). Failure to make a timely claim of exemptions will
not defeat the right, General Orders in Bankruptcy Number 11, unless the tardiness
would adversely affect creditors. In re Fowler, 35 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1940); In re
W.S. Jennings & CO., 166 F. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1909).
30 BANKRuPTcY Acr § 47a (6).
31 Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903).
32 Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511, 515 (1913).
33 Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 322 (1931).
34 Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 583-84 (1935); Prebyl v. Prudential
Life Inc. Co, 98 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1938); Personal Finance CO. v. Silver, 327 Ill.
App. 554, 64 N.E.2d 398 (1946).
35 Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294. 299-300 (1903); In re Urban, 136 F.2d
296, 298 (7th Cir. 1943); Negin v. Salomon, 151 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1945); In re
Yungbluth, 220 F. 110, 111-112 (9th Cir. 1915).
36 Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903).
37 BANKRUPTCY AcT § Ila.
38 Id. at § 17. All provable debts are discharged except the six classes enumerated
in this section. See J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCy § 111 (1956) which discusses the ef-
fects of a discharge.
39 BANKRuPTCY Acr § 17.
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to the bankrupt's exempt property will be rendered valueless un-
less they have obtained a surviving lien.
The final discharge of a bankrupt occurs according to a pre-
scribed timetable.40 Creditors who obtain permission to proceed
in state court must also have discharge withheld if they are to reach
exempt property. In Lockwood v. Exchange Bank4l an unsecured
creditor held a note containing a provision which waived the bank-
rupt's right of homestead in the creditor's favor. The creditor peti-
tioned the bankruptcy court to order the trustee to retain the
exempt property. This property would be held for satisfaction of
the creditor's claim. The United States Supreme Court held the
creditor's claim should be asserted in a state court because the bank-
ruptcy court has limited jurisdiction over exempt property. The
Court stated
the rights of creditors having no lien, as in the case at bar, but
having a remedy under the state law against the exempt prop-
erty, may be protected by the court of bankruptcy, since, cer-
tainly, there would exist in favor of a creditor holding a waiver
note, like that possessed by the petitioning creditor in the case
at bar, an equity entitling him to a reasonable postponement
of the discharge of the bankrupt, in order to allow the institu.
tion in the state court of such proceedings as might be neces-
sary to make effective the rights possessed by the creditor.42
(Emphasis added.)
It appears from the above quotation that a creditor may have
the bankrupt's final discharge withheld if he complies with two
requirements. First, he must present a claim which prima facie
indicates an available state remedy. Second, the claim must be one
which may be satisfied by executing on exempt property already
set off to the bankrupt. Creditors complying with these two re-
quirements necessarily fall within a class to whom the exemption
does not apply. Lockwood has provided a procedure that operates
to the advantage of creditors within that class. If Harris v. Hoffman48
is followed, only specific kinds of creditors within that class may
obtain a Lockwood stay.
An analysis of Lockwood's scope requires examination of its
judicial constructions and the Bankruptcy Act. In 1913 section 67f
of the Bankruptcy Act provided
40 See I W. Co.LIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 14.03-15.00 (14th ed. 1967).
41 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
42 Id. at 300.
43 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
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That all levies, judgments, attadunents, or other liens, obtained
through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent,
at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy against him... shall be deemed null and void
in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected
[thereby] ... shall be deemed wholly discharged and released
from the same, and shall pass to the trustees as a part of the
estate of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, on due notice,
order that the right . . . be preserved for the benefit of the
estate .... 44
Confronted with a conflict in lower court decisions, the United
States Supreme Court in Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall" held sec-
tion 67f operated to discharge liens obtained within the four month
period on exempt as well as non-exempt property. If the decision
in Hall had been limited to the above holding there would have
been a basic conflict between creditors in two different positions.
Unsecured creditor A, to whom the property set off to the bankrupt
is not exempt, might obtain a Lockwood stay and proceed in the
state courts to secure his claim. Creditor B, to whom the property
is also not exempt, but who had obtained a lien within four months
prior to the date of petition, would have his lien discharged. The
above anomaly did not escape the Hall Court, which reconciled its
decision with Lockwood:
The liens rendered void by § 67f are those obtained by legal
proceedings within four months. The section does not, how-
ever, defeat rights in the exempt property acquired by contract
or by waiver of the exemption. These may be enforced or fore-
dosed by judgments obtained even after the petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed, under the principle declared in Lockwood
.. .46
44 J. MAcLAmHLAN, THE BANKRUPTCY Aar III (7th ed. 1965).
45 229 U.S. 511 (1913).
46 Id. at 516. In 1938 the Chandler Act was enacted as an attempt to clarify
ambiguous areas in bankruptcy lav. Sections 67a and 67f in the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act were consolidated in § 67a by the Chandler Act. Section 67a (3) states:
The property affected by any Hen deemed null and void under provisions of
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision a shall be discharged from such
lien, and such property and any of the indemnifying property transferred
to or for the benefit of a surety shall pass to the trustee or debtor, as the
case may be, except that the court may on due notice order any such lien
to be preserved for the benefit of the estate, and the court may direct such
conveyance as may be proper or adequate to evidence the title thereto of the
trustee or debtor, as the case may be .... (Emphasis added.)
The italicized language is a codification of Hall. HR. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)
209; J. HANNA & J. MACLAcHtLAN, Tim BiutuercY Acr WNmt r,'NorAMoNS 96 (5th
ed. 1953); 4 CoruiE, BAKRurrcy 67.02, 67.15. Neither legislative history nor any
known case evidences any intent to limit the opinion in Hall. For criticisms of Hall
see J. MAcLAcHLAN, BANR UPTcy § 208.
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This language has'been interpreted as creating an exception to the
discharge of liens on exempt property.4 In cases where lienholders
possess waivers of exemption or rights in the exempt property ob-
tained by contract, their liens are not discharged by section 67.48
Harris v. Hoffman49 held the Hall exception defined the scope of
the Lockwood stay. Only waiver or contract creditors may have the
discharge withheld for the purpose of Obtaining a lien on the bank-
rupt's exempt property.
It is important to consider the trustee's right of lien preserva-
tion provided in section 67a (3) .0 This right places the trustee in
competition with creditors and the bankrupt for exempt property.
The trustee's fiduciary obligations to general creditors would seem
to compel him to preserve liens whenever possible if the preserva-
tion would benefit general creditors. This is true regardless of the
resulting detriment to individual creditors of the bankrupt. Pre-
serving liens on exempt property will always benefit general credi-
tors unless the cost of obtaining execution is prohibitive.
Assume a situation where the trustee has set off property to the
bankrupt as exempt. Creditor A requests the final discharge be
withheld so he may seek a state court judgment and lien on the
property. The property is not exempt to him under state statute.
Creditor B, to whom the property is also not exempt under state
statute, holds a lien on the property. The lien was obtained by ju-
dicial proceedings within four months of the petition in bankruptcy.
Because his lien is valueless to him, creditor B is also seeking a
Lockwood stay to obtain a new lien. The trustee is seeking to pre-
serve creditor B's lien, the only lien on the exempt property, for
the benefit of general creditors. The bankrupt is attempting to have
creditor B's lien discharged, prevent the trustee's preservation and
prevent the stays requested by creditors A and B. The claim of
each creditor is for 1,000 dollars, the value of the property.
It is evident from the facts that only one of the four parties
4T In re Goldberg, 254 F. 440, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1918); Citizens Savings Bank v.
Astrin, 44 Del. 451, 458, 61 A.2d 419, 422 (Super. Ct. 1948); Equitable Credit Co. v.
Miller, 164 Ga. 49, 137 S.E. 771, 772-73 (1927); Dockery v. Flanary, 194 Va. 818, 78
S.E.2d 375 (1952).
48 See authorities cited id.
49 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
50 See note 46 supra for text of § 67a (3). Section 67f included the trustee's right
of lien preservation. Section 67a(3) retains this right in substantially the same lan.
guage. The Hall decision was codified in the same section (67a (3)). Professor Mac,
Lachlan argues these facts indicate a legislative intent to subordinate the bankrupt's
right of lien discharge to the trustee's right of lien preservation. J. MACLACHILAN,
BANKRUPTCY § 209 at 230. See text accompanying notes 51-55 infra.
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can succeed. n resolving such a dispute a court must first determine
whether creditor B's lien will be preserved for the general creditors
or will be discharged. Professor MacLachlan argues section 67 is a
statute drawn for the benefit of general creditors and thus the trus-
tees should always prevail over the bankrupt on the question of lien
preservation. 51 His conclusion is sound only if one agrees with the
premise that section 67 is drawn solely for the benefit of general
creditors. But it is arguable the discharge of liens on exempt prop-
erty is for the benefit of the bankrupt. The Court reasons in Hall:
This property is withdrawn from the possession of the Trustee
not for the purpose of being subjected to such liens, but on the
supposition that it needed no protection in as much as they
had been nullified. 52
The protection provided by such nullification benefits the bankrupt.
The court recognized section 67 as an attempt to provide equitable
distribution of the bankrupt's assets by preservation of the status
of creditors existing prior to their race of diligence. If liens on
property are not discharged under section 67 grab law will prevail.
If the race of diligence is concentrated upon- exempt property alone,
the footrace will not be appreciably slowed, and a somewhat limited
number of participants will soon defeat all of the bankrupt's exemp-
tons. Hall, in an attempt to prevent such a result, allowed dis-
charge of liens on exempt property. The discharge in Hall was not
an attempt to enable the trustee to preserve the liens, but rather
was aimed at protecting the bankrupt.
MacLachlan's assertion also appears to be contrary to the pur-
pose of providing the trustee with the right of lien preservation:
[]o allow the trustee to be subrogated . . . so that bene-
fits intended for the estate by voiding a lien or transfer do not
thereby become a windfall to a junior incumbrancer. 53
A junior encumbrancer is one who is second in priority to a lien-
holder. Upon execution, distribution is made to the junior encum-
brancer only after complete satisfaction of the senior claim. If the
lien were discharged, the junior encumbrancer whose security in-
terest is not discharged would be elevated to an undeserved prior-
ity. When the benefits of lien discharge are intended for the bank-
rupt, as in the case of exempt property, the purpose for preserva-
tion is not altered. In a case construing another lien preservation
51 J. MAcILAHLAN, BAKR UpTcY § 209 at 230.
52 Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511, 516 (1913).
53 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Schulein, 282 F.2d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1960).
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section of the Bankruptcy Act,54 the court noted:
If ... there had been a junior encumbrancer whose lien was
not voidable as to the trustee there would be occasion for pres-
ervation1 5
It thus appears a trustee may properly preserve liens on exempt
property only where junior encumbrancers could remove that prop-
erty from the bankruptcy.
The trustee's competition with creditors A and B and the bank-
rupt is thus limited. Since creditor B holds the only encumbrance
on the exempt property, his lien cannot be preserved by the trus-
tee. It will be discharged. The conflict among the remaining parties
must now be resolved. Prior cases have allowed creditor A a stay
in bankruptcy.56 Apparently perceiving the inequity of disfavoring
the more diligent creditor B, courts have also allowed him a stay.51
This effectively defeats the bankrupt's exemption and the right of
lien discharge given him in Hall. The error lies not in the percep-
tion that A should not be preferred over B, but in the conclusion
that either must be preferred over the bankrupt.
The court in Harris v. Hoffman 5s indicates only waiver or con-
tract creditors must be preferred over the bankrupt. Other con-
structions of Hall and Lockwood are possible. If all exemption sta-
tutes made property exempt from the attaching of a lien,50 the only
liens which could exist would be those whose holders are within ex-
ceptions to those exemptions. Thus, all valid existing liens would
be executable under state law. But most exemption statutes pro-
vide specified property shall be exempt only from judicial sale, not
from the attachment of liens. 0° Existing liens may be executable
or unexecutable under such statutes. Holders of unexecutable liens
await satisfaction from a future transferee of the property. It is
arguable that while section 67 operates to discharge all liens ob-
tained within the four month period, a Lockwood stay is permissi-
ble for any creditor who is able to obtain execution under state
law. Thus, as a practical matter, section 67 would remove liens
54 BANKRUPTCY Acr § 70e, 11 US,C. § 110 (1964).
55 In re Espelund, 181 F. Supp. 108, 115 (D. Wash. 1959).
56 See cases cited note 13 supra.
57 No federal cases have been found which have decided this precise question.
McMains v. Cunningham, 214 Iowa 300, 242 N.W. 106 (1932), and Northern Shoo Co,
v. Cecka, 22 N.). 631, 135 N.W. 177 (1912), involve creditors seeking new liens be-
cause -their prior liens were discharged. These creditors obviously had obtained stays,
58 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
59 See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.4031 (1961).
0 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.16 (1946).
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which are unexecutable while the bankrupt has title to the proper-
ty. This argument is less tenuous upon recollection that the Lock-
wood Court directed its stay provision to creditors having a remedy
under the state law against the exempt property.8 ' Such credi-
tors are those who are within exceptions to the exemptions.
These creditors were not overlooked in Hall. The Court cited
three cases including such creditors.6 2 It certainly appears this larg-
er and more obvious class of creditors would have been included
in the Hall exception along with waiver and contract creditors if
they were construed by the Court to be within the Lockwood rule.
The nature of the equity recognized in Lockwood as entitling
the waiver holder to a stay must be examined. In a since overruled
Ninth Circuit case, the court lamented the inequity of the Lockwood
rule:
To relegate the pre-existing creditors to the state courts is
to ignore their rights in the... exemption and place them in
a position where one [pre-existing] creditor, because of prompt
action, might get all the . . . [exempt property] . . to the
exclusion of all other pre-existing creditors.
Such an unfair result is contrary to the policy of the Bank.
ruptcy Act. Its policy is not to subject creditors to the haphazard
chance of "grab law". 8s
The underlying theme of bankruptcy is that equality is equity.6'
Why the unique treatment of waiver and contract creditors?6 5
An exemption is personal to the bankrupt.06 He may in some
states waive the exemption in favor of one or all creditors8 T or he
61 190 U.S. 294, 300 (1903).
62 In re Forbes, 186 F. 79 (9th Cir. 1911) (The creditor attached his Hen prior to
the bankrupt's declaration of homestead. Thus the creditor was within the statutory
exception to the state exemption law); In re Driggs, 171 F. 897 (SD. N.Y. 1909); In re
Durham, 104 F. 231 (F.D. Ark. 1900).
63 England v. Sanderson, 256 F.2d 641, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1956), overruled on unre-
lated grounds in Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'1 Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). For other
criticism of Lockwood see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 462, Comment, 68 YArX I.J. 1459,
1477 (1959).
64 Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. Rzv. 223, 225,
235 (1918).
65 For a cogent criticism of special treatment for waiver holders and proposed leg-
islation see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 467.
66 In re Blanchard & Howard, 161 F. 797 (E.D. N.C. 1908); In re Schuller, 108
F. 591, 592 (E.D. Wis. 1901).
67 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1101 (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-22 (1950); McCormick
Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Vaughn, 130 Ala. 314, 317, 30 So. 363, 364 (1900); Opportun-
ity B. & L. Assn. v. Silverman, 38 Pa. D. & C. 575, 576 (C.P. 1940). See also Comment,
68 YAiE L.J. 1459, 1496 (1959), which proposes federal abolition of w-aivers in bank-
ruptcy.
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may assign it.68 Those rights, where not abolished by state law,
may be utilized by the debtor to bargain with his creditors prior to
bankruptcy. The bankrupt receives something in return for their
surrender. It is a denial of an obvious equity to prevent a creditor
from asserting his claim where he has given value for a specific
right in the property. The Hoffman court correctly suggests a bank-
rupt be estopped from avoiding a lien by means of discharge when
he has issued a waiver note or has contractually assigned his exemp-
tion right to the lienholder.6 9
68 In re National Grocer Co., 181 F. 33 (6th Cir. 1910) ; Lyle v. Roswell Store Inc.,
187 Ga. 386, 200 S.E. 702 (1938).
69 Harris v. Hoffinan, 379 F.2d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 1967). The theory of estoppel
was suggested in Note, 40 VA. L. REv. 83 (1954). The conclusion Harris v. Hoffman
is rightly decided assumes that Lockwood and Hall must be reconciled. The heavy
limitation placed on Lockwood creates doubt concerning its vitality.
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EVIDENCE-CREDIBILrY OF WrrNESSES-PSYCHATRIC EXAMINATION
OF PRNCIPAL WtNESS IN MURDER TRIAL DENIED-People v. Nash,
36 IU.2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473 (1966)-A widely discussed evi-
dentiary problem is the effect to be given the evergrowing body of
knowledge in the field of psychiatry relating to the credibility of
witnesses.' Courts have often admitted psychiatric testimony,2 but
have been reluctant to order a psychiatric examination of a witness.3
People v. Nash4 typifies the judicial system's hesitation. In Nash,
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, refused to order a psy-
chiatric examination of Triplett, the prosecution's principal witness,
though the defendant, Nash, alleged that Triplett was a psychopath.
On the basis of Triplett's testimony,5 Nash was convicted of murder.
The conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois.6
The court apparently confused two issues in the case: (1)
whether the psychiatric examination should have been ordered, and
(2) whether the results of such an examination would have been
admissible to aid the jury in determining Triplett's credibility. The
court, in discussing the admissibility issue, stated psychiatrists were
I See Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199 (1958); Conrad, Mental
Examination of Witnesses, 11 SYRACUSE L. REv. 149 (1960); Diamond & Louisell, The
Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Miet. L.
REv. 1335 (1965); Jones, Admission of Psychiatric Testimony in Alger Hiss Trial,
11 A". Lawyer 212 (1950); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses:
A Suggested Approach, 48 CaijF. L. REv. 648 (1960); Roch, Truth-telling, Psychiatric
Expert Testimony and the Impeachment of Witnesses, 22 PEN. B. A. Q. 140 (1951);
Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiatry and the Credibility of Testimony, 19 U. FLA. L.
Rxv. 1 (1966); 'Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 Go. W,.Su
L. Rxv. 53 (1965); Comment, Effect of Mental Deficiency on Competency and Credibil-
ity, 36 MicH. L. Rnv. 818 (1938); Comment, Psychiatric Testimony to Impeach the
Credibility of a Witness, 14 N.Y.U. LvruL L. REv. 239 (1959); Note, The Mentally
Abnormal Witness: Challenges to His Competence and Credibility, 13 RutrcE3s L.
Rxv. 330 (1958); Note, Psychiatric Challenge of Witnesses, 9 VAND. L. REv. 860
(1956); Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal T'itness, 59 YALE L.J.
1324 (1950).
2 People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 NAV. 387 (1929); State v. Palmer, 206
Minn. 185, 288 N.W. 160 (1939); State v. -Wesler, 1 N.J. 58, 61 A.2d 746 (1948);
Aguilar v. State, 279 App. Div. 103, 108 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1951).
3 Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
4 36 Il.2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473 (1966).
5 The only other evidence presented by the prosecution was testimony by a
woman who saw Nash and Triplett across from the victim's office the day before the
crime and certain real evidence which could not be connected to Nash without
Triplett's testimony.
6 Constitutional issues were also raised in Nash relating to the state's obligation
to provide an independent laboratory examination of physical evidence for the bene-
fit of the defense. This issue forms the basis of an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.
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in disagreement over the characteristics of a psychopathic personal-
ity.7 Because of this disagreement, the 'court argued the results of
such an examination would be of no probative value to the jury.
Therefore, the court concluded an examination should Yiot have
been ordered.9 The court in effect ruled on the admissibility of evi-
dence not yet produced and then used this ruling as a basis for not
ordering an examination. A second reason advanced by the court
for not allowing an examination was that an alternative method for
impeaching Triplett was available.10
Ordering a psychiatric examination has gained greatest accept-
ance in the area of sex offenses." If a defendant has been accused
of a sex crime, such as rape, the victim of the alleged assault is often
the only prosecution witness.12 When the testimony of the victim is
uncorroborated, her credibility while testifying is often the determ-
inative issue in the case. As Wigmore has pointed out the victims of
sexual assaults may often suffer from mental abnormalities which
greatly affect credibility.13 It has been argued that an examination
of the victim should be ordered if reasonable grounds are shown for
believing his credibility is affected by such an abnormality. 14
Few courts have ordered a psychiatric examination of a witness
in areas other than sex offenses. However, the facts in State v. But-
ler,15 where an examination was ordered, are very similar to Nash.
In Butler, the defendant was brought to trial for murder. Coleman,
allegedly an'accomplice to the crime, was charged separately. He
became the state's principal witness in the trial of Butler. The de-
fense produced records from a state mental institution which indi-
cated Coleman's credibility might be affected by a mental abnormal-
7 People v. Nash, 36 I1L.2d 275, 279, 222 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1966).
8 Id. at 279, 222 N.E.2d at 475.
9 Id. at 280, 222 N.E.2d at 476.
10 Id. at 280, 222 N.E2d at 475.
11 C. MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 45 at 99 (1954).
12 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950).
13 3 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 924a, 934a (3rd ed. 1940).
14 C. MCCO"MICK, EVIDENCE § 45, at 98 (1954); State v. Klucber, 132 N.W.2d 847
(S.D. Sup. Ct. 1965), where a psychiatric examination was ordered of a complaining
witness in an indecent molestation case. See People v. Stice, 165 Cal. App. 2d. 287,
290, 331 P.2d 468, 470 (1958), where the court did not order an examination but
stated it was within the discretion of the trial court to do so; 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950).
'5 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958), cited with approval in State v. Klucber, 132
N.W.2d 847, 850 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1965); see Conrad, Mental Examination of Witnesses,
11 SYRACUSE L. REV. 149, 160 (1959), "Certainly State v. Butler is one of the cvldentlal
monuments of our times."; Note, The Mentally Abnormal Witness: Challenges to His
Competence and Credibility, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 30, 841, 342, 844 (1958).
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ity.16 Basing their request on these records, the defense moved that
the court order a psychiatric examination of Coleman. The trial
court denied the motion, Butler was convicted, and he appealed to
the'New Jersey Supreme Court, which held the trial court had in-
herent power to order a psychiatric examination of a witness "upon
a substantial showing of need and justification."' 17 The Court found
such a showing had been made and reversed the lower court.18
In Taborsky v. State'9 the defendant was tried and convicted of
murder. Before trial, the court denied defendant's motion for a psy-
chiatric examination of the state's principal witness. After convic-
tion, the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence? 0 This motion was also denied. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed stating a new trial should
have been ordered on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
court commented that a psychiatric examination of the principal
witness could have been ordered after he was called to testify.2 '
In-People v. Nash the principal witness, Triplett, was called to
testify by the prosecution. His credibility became a disputed issue
in the case. Any evidence relating to his credibility was therefore
relevant. The results of a psychiatric examination, if probative of
Triplett's credibility, would have been admissible. The court in
Nash should have first ruled on the question whether a psychiatric
examination of Triplett should have been ordered then on the ad-
missibility of the results after they were made available. The above
cases indicate a number of factors, none of which were mentioned
by the Illinois Supreme Court, which would have been valuable
in deciding this question. It appears that substantial need and justi-
fication 22 exist at least when: (1) the defendant faces serious sanc-
tion if convicted; (2) conviction depends on the testimony of one
16 Coleman was committed to the Crownsville State Hospital in Maryland from
July 9 to September 5, 1954. In the report from that institution it was stated that
Coleman "when confronted with unavoidable difficulties ... may try to bluff through
them. 'State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 598, 143 A.2d 550, 552 (1958).
17 State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (1958).
18 Id.
19 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 433 (1955).
20 The newly discovered evidence was psychiatric testimony that the principal
witness was a psychotic who could not tell the truth and had been suffering from this
condition when he had testified.
21 Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 630, 116 A.2d 433, 438 (1955).
22 State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A2d 530, 556 (1958).
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witness; (3) the witness's testimony is uncorroborated2 8; and (4)
the defense shows reasonable grounds for believing the witness'
competence or credibility is questionable due to a mental abnormal-
ity.24 When the jury must decide guilt or innocence on the basis of
the witness' testimony alone, his credibility becomes the crucial issue
in the case. If the witness does in fact suffer from a mental abnor-
mality, especially if he is a pathological liar,25 his credibility may be
greatly affected by such a condition. 26 The jury, however, may be
unable to evaluate his credibility. His demeanor on the stand will
be of little help, for psychopathic personalities often appear quite
normal. 27 Cross-examination may even be ineffective as a method of
impeachment. 28 With no psychiatric evidence reflecting the witness'
lack of credibility the jury is free to find the witness credible.29 It
seems manifestly unjust to allow conviction in a situation where the
reliability of the witness is dubious, the jury's judgment of credibility
based on tenuous grounds, and the impending sanctions against the
defendant are great. When the above conditions are present an ex-
amination of the witness must be ordered by the court.80 Failure
28 The first three factors mentioned do not relate to the probativity of the ex-
amination but rather to the question whether a court should subject a noncooperative
citizen to analysis assuming the probativity of the examination is already established.
The purpose of this note is not to suggest that these are the correct standards. Some
lesser standard might be used. However, the fact pattern in Nash satisfies even this
strict standard with the only questionable issue being would the evidence gained
from this examination be probative, and if so, did the defense present the court with
reasonable grounds to believe it would be probative of the issue of Triplett's credibility.
24 The court in Butler mentions only ". . . substantial need and justification."
But it emphasizes that this exists when the four conditions are present. State v.
Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (1958).
25 See Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE
LJ. 1324, 1330 (1950).
26 Karpman, Lying: A Minor Inquiry into the Ethics of Neurotic and Psycho.
pathic Behavior, 40 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 135, 153 (1949).
27 Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEO. WAsu. L. R.v.
53, 86 (1965).
28 Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199, 201 (1958).
29 Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J.
1324, 1341 (1950):
Without the benefit of psychiatric assistance a jury may of course make the
proper evaluation of an abnormal witness' credibility. But its decision Is at
best an intuitive guess; good luck alone can make it correct.
80 State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958). See alo Conrad, Psychiatric
Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199 (1958); Conrad, Mental Examination of Witnesses, 11
SYRA CUsE L. REv. 149 (1960); Note, Psychiatric Examination of the Mentally Abnormal
Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324, 1339-40 (1950):
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to order such an examination is an abuse of the court's discretion.31
In Nash the four conditions were present. The defendant was
being tried for murder, a crime with the most serious of sanctions.
Triplett's testimony was uncorroborated and was the only evidence
which could connect Nash with the crime. The only questionable
factor was whether the defense presented reasonable grounds for be-
lieving Triplett's credibility was affected by a mental abnormality.
Attached to the petition requesting the court to order an examina-
tion was a letter from the Supervisor of Records for the State Prison
of Southern Michigan where Triplett had been incarcerated during
periods between 1942 and 1962.32 The letter quoted a prison psy-
chologist as stating that Triplett "gives me the impression as being
a true psychopath ... ."33 The question remains: Was this sufficient
evidence to cast Triplett's credibility in doubt?
As the Nash court noted, psychiatrists disagree over the char-
acteristics of a psychopathic personality because the word "psycho-
path" is used to describe a great number of people with different
personality characteristics.3 4 This lack of agreement is not a valid
reason for refusing to order a psychiatric examination because the
general class of psychopaths may include people classified as patho-
logical liars.35 These people appear quite normal 6 and easily pass
the traditional tests of competency. 7 But such a person's credibility
To provide juries with maximum psychiatric assistance, courts should order
clinical examination of any witness by a court.appointed psychiatrist upon
a reasonable showing that the witness may be suffering from a mental illness
likelyto affect his credibility.
For a contrary view see Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the
Determination of Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions
of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRAcusa L. REv. 564 (1963).
31 It is generally held that a court has the power to order a psychiatric examina-
tion of a witness. This power may be exercised as a matter of the trial court's dis-
cretion. See Carrado v. United States, 210 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 154). cert. denied, 350
U.S. 938 (1956); People v. Stice, 165 Cal. App. 2d 287, 331 P.2d 468 (1958); Taborsky
v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 43 (1955); State v. Butler, 27 NJ. 560, 145 A.2d
530 (1958).
32 People v. Nash, 36 Ill.2d 275, 278-79, 222 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1966).
33 Id.
34 Note, The Psychopathic Personality, 10 Rtrrcmts L. REv. 425, 433, (1955):
Mhis type of mental disorder has frequently been called a 'scrap basket'
in which to cast all personalities of which there is any doubt regarding analy-
sis. That the concept represents a distinct form or perhaps forms of mental
abnormality, however, is not doubted.
35 WVeihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEo. WAsu. L RE%-.
53, 86 (1965).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 68.
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may be greatly affected by this condition.88 The psychopath "is sO
utterly devoid of any sense of guilt, he feels justified in telling all
sorts of lies to escape the consequences of his acts."' )9
The Sociopath [psychopath 40 may harbor unconscious hos-
tilities that lead to false accusations or biased testimony. He may
crave the publicity that his accusations give him or, driven by
unconscious motives, may indulge in repetitious lying which is
wholly irrational and without any discernible end .... His lies,
indeed, are often told with more conviction than normal persons
show. Even when his lying is exposed, he is able to make quick
adjustments and thoroughly mislead the layman .... 41
have ordered a psychiatric examination of Triplett for the purpose
of determining whether he was in the class of psychopathic person-
alities whose disorder would affect either competency or credibility.
A secondary reason advanced by the court for not ordering an
examination was that:
The prison psychologist's letter42 gave the court 'reasonable grounds
to believe Triplett's credibility was in doubt. The ,trial court should
It has always been permissible to show that a witness, in.
cluding the accused in a criminal case, if he takes the stand, has
a bad reputation for truth and veracity,... It would seem un-
necessary to raise the issue of whether a witness is a psychopath,
from which a jury could infer that he possesses the characteristic
of untruthfulness, when direct evidence of a witness's reputation
for truthfulness is admissible 48
The court in, effect has ruled psychiatric evidence, as a means of im-
peachment, inadmissible if an alternative method of impeachment
is available. This rationale has been strenuously criticized.44 The
far better reasoning is that of State v. Armstrong,45 where the court
stated any means of impeachment was permissible if the witness's
88 Mack, Forensic Psychiatry and the Witness-A Survey, 7 CxaLv.-MAR. L. REV,
802, 314 (1958), quoting H.S. Whiting, M.D. and psychiatrist, Connecticut State
Hospital, Middletown, Connecticut: "Sociopaths [psychopaths] are so careless with
the truth as to always be suspect."
89 Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 Gao. WAsii. L. REv.
53, 86 (1965).
40 The terms sociopath and psychopath are synonymous, the former having gained
more general usage.
41 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 86.
42 People v. Nash, 36 Ill2d 275, 278-79, 222 N.E.2d 478, 475 (1966).
48 Id.
44 Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 84 Gro. WAsh. L. Rv,
53, 68 (1965).
45 282 N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950).
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credibility was the determinative issue in the case. The court asserted
the law valued the direct over the indirect. Evidence showing the
mental state of the witness was held direct while evidence of bad
reputation for truth was indirect. 4 The conclusion was that evidence
of the mental condition of a witness was admissible as a means to
discredit him.
The Nash court's alternative method argument is further weak-
ened by their refusal to order attendance of certain out-of-state wit-
nesses though requested to do so by the defendant.47 Nash and
Triplett resided in Michigan. Nothing in the decision suggested
that anyone in Illinois knew Triplett well enough to testify that he
had a bad reputation for truth and veracity. Thus, the alternative
suggested by the court was most likely not available to Nash.
The Illinois Supreme Court, without considering the factors
relevant to ordering a psychiatric examination of a witness, ruled
the results of such an examination inadmissible. Conditions necessi-
tating an examination of the witness were present in Nash. The
findings from a psychiatric examination of Triplett may have proven
him to be a pathological liar and thereby affected the jury's determ-
ination of his credibility. Only after the results of such an examina-
don were available to the court should it have dealt with their ad-
missibility.48
46 Id. at 728-29, 62 S.E2d at 51.
47 People v. Nash, 36 IU.2d 275, 281, 222 N.E2d 473, 476 (1966).
48 The test generally used to determine the admissibility of psychiatric opinion is
whether the techniques or theories upon which they are based have won
general acceptanceamong scientists in the field.
Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach,
48 CAIw.'. REv. 6-8, 658 (1960); see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923); Weihofen. Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 Gao. WMtU. L. RPv.
53 70-71 (1965). This test may have been held to exclude testimony proving Triplett
a psychopath. However, most courts which have faced the question have admitted
such evidence. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Coffin v. Reichard,
148 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1945); People v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 457, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1951);
State v. Wesler, 137 N.J.L. 311, 59 A.2d 834 (1948); Ellarson v. FIlarson, 198 App. Div.
103, 190 N.Y.S. 6 (1921); Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920).
But see Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 181 Pa. Super. 630, 124 A.2d 693 (1956). In
Nash the important question is not whether the witness was a psychopath but whether
he was a pathological liar. Any evidence which reflects a witness' untruthfulness
should be submitted to the jury. They will be left with the ultimate determination
of the witness' credibility. With improved procedure for examining the expert wit-
ness, the jury could hear the testimony, yet be shown that psycldatrists disagree over
the effects of a psychopathic personality. See Dieden & Gasparich, Psychiatric Evidence
and Full Disclosure in the Criminal Trial, 52 CAUL1. L. Rav. 543 (1964).
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CRIMINAL LAW -EFFECTIVENESS OF APPOINTED COUNSEL-Ents-
minger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967)-Petitioner, who was represented
at trial by a court-appointed attorney, was convicted of uttering a
forged instrument. Shortly after the verdict was rendered, he re-
quested the trial court to appoint different counsel to aid him in
the preparation of a motion for a new trial. Counsel was appointed,
the motion was prepared and filed, but the trial court overruled it.
Upon application, the same attorney was appointed to represent
the petitioner on appeal; counsel then prepared and filed a timely
notice of appeal. Filing this notice of appeal entitled the petitioner
to a review by the Supreme Court of Iowa based on a "clerk's tran-
script" which contained only the Information or Indictment, the
Grand Jury minutes, the Bailiff's Oath, Statement and Instructions
and various orders and judgment entries of the court. Such a tran-
script did not contain the transcript of evidence nor the briefs or
argument of counsel. In order to perfect a plenary appeal, includ-
ing the transcript of evidence, briefs and argument of counsel,
notice must be filed. Upon the petitioner's request, his appointed
counsel filed such notice which, even though filed late, was allowed
by the Supreme Court of Iowa. For unexplained reasons, the court-
appointed attorney failed to file the entire record of the trial, al-
though it had been prepared by the state. Despite the petitioner's
request that the court issue an order commanding the trial court
to transmit the certified record for its consideration, the Supreme
Court of Iowa, after reviewing only the "clerk's transcript" in ac-
cordance with Iowa law, affirmed the conviction.1
Granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, revers-
ing the Iowa Supreme Court, concluded that "on the bare election
of his appointed counsel.., all hope of any adequate and effective
appeal at all was taken from the petitioner."2
Whenever a reviewing court is presented with a fact situation
such as the one involved in this case, it immediately encounters
the obstacle raised by the presumption that the lower court is suf-
ficiently competent to appoint and oversee the conduct of capable
counsel for indigent defendants. 8 The fact that the Court was will-
ing to override that presumption may indicate a further willingness
on its part to set standards against which the conduct of attorneys
may be measured. Although this case involved the question of the
effectiveness of a court-appointed counsel on appeal, the problem is
not limited to the appellate process. In order to do substantial jus-
1 - Iowa -, 137 N.W.2d 281 (1965).
2 386 U.S. 748, 750 (1967).
8 See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. RT-x. 1531, 1535 (1963).
[Vol. 29
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tice, the requirements imposed on court-appointed counsel at the
appellate level must be the same as those imposed at the trial and
earlier.4
In the past, the Supreme Court has not established an operable
standard by which to judge the effectiveness of counsel. Any stand-
ards which have been established have come from lower federal
courts5 or from state courts.6 An attempt to derive any meaningful
guidelines from these pronouncements is futile. Generally, these
courts have only articulated empty phrases. For example, effective
assistance of counsel has been defined as follows:
The services of counsel meet the requirements of the due
process clause when he is a member in good standing at the
bar, gives his client his complete loyalty, serves him in good
faith to the best of his ability, and his service is of such a char-
acter as to preserve the essential integrity of the proceedings
as a trial in a court of justice. He is not required to be infal-
lible.7
4 See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense as a Ground for Post.con.
viction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. Rv. 289 (1964).
5 See, e.g., Fields v. Petyon, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967) (counsel appointed
fifteen or thirty minutes before trial advised client to plead guilty without questioning
him as to his guilt of jailbreak and statutory burglary; held, defendant not afforded
effective assistance of counsel); Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965)
(appointed counsel failed to file plea of insanity in writing as required by statute,
causing defendant to be tried without the benefit of a defense to murder and robbery;
ineffective assistance); DeRoche v. United States, 337 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1964) (two
days to prepare defense to passing counterfeit coins; effective assistance); Mitchell v.
United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958) (failure to
move for acquital, to cross-examine, to object to hearsay evidence, and to object to
a patently erroneous charge to jury; effective assistance); United States v. Wight. 176
F2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950) (conferred fifteen minutes
and advised defendant to plead guilty; effective assistance).
6 See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Boies, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964) (appointed
counsel assigned to defendant not satisfactory to him; no requirement to appoint
counsel of defendant's choice); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487 (1963)
(counsel's failure to object to admission of evidence allegedly obtained as the result
of an illegal search and seizure because of ignorance of rule of law; ineffective assist-
ance); Commonwealth v. Drolet, 337 Mass. 396, 149 N.E.2d 616 (1958) (right to
counsel not violated where defendant refused appointed counsel and partidpated
actively in his own defense); State v. Rinaldi, 58 N.J. Super. 209, 156 A.2d 28 (1959)
(no facts given in support of allegation of ineffectiveness); Commonwealth v. O'Keefe,
298 Pa. 169, 148 A. 73 (1929) (defendant tried and convicted on liquor charge within
five hours of arrest over retained counsel's protest; not denied right to effective
counsel).
7 United States ex. rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1950).
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So long as the attorney's performance was not so incompetent as to
make the trial a sham, farce or mere pretense,8 courts have gener-
ally considered accusations that the trial or appellate counsel was
incompetent as apparitions of hindsight engendered from long hours
spent in the prison's library or in comparing notes concerning what
other prisoners' counsel did or did not do."
Every court considering this problem has agreed that to be ef-
fective, counsel need not be successful, 10 nor must he have followed
every possible avenue of defense." The fact that he used improvi-
dent strategy, or made mistakes, or was careless and inexperienced
does not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 12
This ill-defined standard, being an out-growth of the now discarded
notion that the due process clause is violated only by conduct that
shocks the conscience of the court, has not kept pace with judicial
developments in other areas of criminal justice.'8
From the beginning of our existence as a country, the assistance
of counsel has been a cherished right.14 The sentiment of our fore-
bearers was expressed in the sixth amendment to the Constitution,
providing:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
8 Nutt v. United States, 335 F2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909
(1964) (failure to object to inadmissible evidence, to ask for restrictive instructions
on certain affirmative defenses; effective assistance); Joseph v. United States, 321 F.2d
710 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 US. 977 (1964) (good discussion of how much
time is enough in determining whether lack of time makes counsel Ineffective).
9 See Waltz, supra note 4, at 290-291.
10 See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47 (10th ir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 847 (1962) (counsel failed to voice a single objection during course of trial pro-
ceedings; effective assistance in light of prosecution's careful and complete case):
Holt v. United States, 303 F.2d 791 (8th ir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 US. 970 (19063)
(counsel present and available throughout trial, conferred with defendant before
and during trial; defendant's unspecified charges unfounded and unjust).
11 United States ex. rel. Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965) (failure
to bring up question of illegal search and seizure not ineffectiveness where defen-
dant voluntarily pleaded guilty).
12 Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cerl denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958) (counsel met once with defendant and advised him to plead guilty without
arguing illegality of arrest or illegality of confession; effective assistance).
18 Compare, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US. 25 (1949) and Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) with Mapp v. Ohio 367 US. 643 (1961), for rejection of the
"shocks the conscience" test with regard to the admission of evidence resulting from
an illegal search and seizure in a state criminal trial.
14 For an analysis of the status of the right to the assistance of counsel in the
colonies see Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, at 1030-34 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Right to
Counsel].
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The current line of Supreme Court cases dealing with the
right to counsel begins with Powell v. Alabama." In that case sev-
eral young negroes were charged with the rape of two white girls.
The trial judge appointed the entire local bar to defend them, and
the defendants, with only a semblance of counsel, were tried speed-
ily and convicted. The Supreme Court of Alabama, over a vigorous
dissent, affirmed the conviction. 1 In reversing the conviction, the
Supreme Court recognized the need of an accused defendant for
the "guiding hand of counsel at every stage in the proceedings
against him."' 7 Continuing, the Court stressed that the duty to
appoint counsel is not discharged "at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep-
aration and trial of the case."' 8 Concluding, the Court declared:
The failure of the trial court to make an effective appoint.
ment of counsel was ... a denial of due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
The standard established by Powell, and its progeny,20 requir-
ing effective appointment of counsel, necessitated appointment ear-
ly enough to enable the lawyer to assist the accused in preparing a
meaningful defense.2' Although it is generally conceded that early
appointment of counsel is necessary for the preparation of a mean-
ingful defense, there is a controversy as to when the appointment
should be required.22 Arguably, the time when a defendant needs
- 15 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16 224 Ala. 524, 141 So. 195 (1932).
17 287 US. 45, 69 (1932).
's Id. at 71.
19 Id. (Emphasis added.)
20 See generally E. CuaTmns, A LAwYEz WimN NEEmDE 10 ff. (1963); Note,
Incompetency of Counsel as a Ground for Attacking Criminal Convictions in Cali-
fornia and Federal Courts, 4 U.CL.A. L. REv. 400 (1957). Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (made it clear that the requirement of the guiding hand of counsel
at any critical stage referred not only to retained counsel, but also to counsel provided
for indigent defendants); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US. 478 (1964) (requires practical
approach in determining whether the guiding hand of counsel is necessary); White
v. Maryland, 373 US. 59 (1963) (counsel required at any preliminary state of prosecu-
tion which may be or is a "critical stage'); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US. 335 (1963)
(struck down the "special circumstances" test of Betts); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942) (applied right to counsel to states under a "special circumstances" test); John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 US. 458 (1938) (extended Powell to noncapital cases but only ap-
plied to federal criminal cases).
21 Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25
Omo ST. LJ. 449, at 486 (1964).
22 L. SimvErn, 1 DEFENSE OF THE PooR iN Ca ahnAL CAsES iN A ic.AN STATE
CouRTs: NATIONAL REPORT 83 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Dfml sE or Trim Poot].
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counsel most is immediately after his arrest and until trial.28 t Un-
less counsel is provided then, the most illustrious counsel practic-
ing before the bar could not overcome the accumulated evidence
marshalled against the defendant at trial.24
There is a danger inherent in our system of criminal justice
that a critical confrontation by the prosecution at the pretrial pro-
ceedings might result in a pre-determination of guilt and reduce
the trial to a mere formality.25 If counsel is provided as soon as the
investigation focuses on the accused, criminal defendants will be
relieved, to some extent, of the original unfairness of the balance
of the state against the individual and any inherent danger will be
lessened.26 By following this procedure, the lawyer would be avail-
able to explain the charge, to investigate the facts, and to prevent
unreasonable detention and unjustified bail.27
In such an ideal system, counsel not only serves the function
of providing technical aid, but he also acts as a needed buffer at
the point of confrontation between the state and the accused.28 The
effectiveness of this appointment must carry through to the appel-
late level in the event of conviction. 2 In order to maintain the ef-
fectiveness of the appointment, the appointed attorney should as-
sist in connection with sentencing and advise whether an appeal
is justified in the circumstances. 80
Having thus arrived at the point where counsel is required to
be effectively appointed for indigents in both federal and state crim-
inal prosecutions, it would seem that little more can be done to
guarantee the exercise of the right to counsel. But, unless the coun-
sel so appointed is effective and competent, the appointment itself
is a useless formality. 31 Implicitly recognizing this, the decision in
Entsminger adds to the Powell requirement of effective appointment
23 A SPECIAL COMmiTTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF TIlE CITY OF NEW
YORK AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR
THE ACCUSED 60 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL JUSTICE].
24 See Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1952).
25 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
26 See Right to Counsel, supra note 14, at 1034.
27 EQUAL JusTrcE at 23. Concerning the problem of unjustified bail, see also
Segal, Some Procedural and Strategic Inequities in Defending the Indigent, 51 A,B.
A.J. 1165 (1965).
28 Right to Counsel at 1048.
20 The right to counsel on appeal has been guaranteed to indigent defendants
by Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
s0 EQUAL JUSrICE at 24.
31 Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1965).
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of counsel the further requirement of appointment of effective
counsel. These two requirements are so intertwined that there may
be little practical difference when viewed through the eyes of the
convicted defendant. They may be distinguished, however, in that
effective appointment of counsel concerns the opportunity of the
court-appointed attorney to aid in preparing a meaningful defense,
while the appointment of effective counsel deals with the problem
of what the appointed counsel does or is capable of doing in pre-
paring a defense when given the opportunity.3 2 Canon 5 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics states that
the lawyer is bound by all fair and honorable means, to present
every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that
no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process
of law.
Notwithstanding this, studies indicate that many defendants are
not getting the advantage of effective counsel under current systems
of providing counsel.33
In light of this state of affairs the Entsminger decision can be
considered to be a harbinger of higher standards in relation to the
effective functioning of counsel defending criminal defendants.
Granting that it is difficult to express in any given formulation of
words standards by which counsel for criminal defendants can mea-
sure their actions and capabilities, an attempt will be made to de-
lineate the boundary below which counsel's conduct should not
fall and still be considered effective.
Of course, the standard could not be that the indigent defen-
dant is entitled to the best counsel that money can buy. Even if
this standard were practical, it would, at times, result in a situation
analogous to calling in a brain surgeon to remove a splinter from
an indigent patient's finger.3 4 At the other extreme, the minimum
standard of ability should not be that the attorney in question has
passed the bar examination.3 5 Admission to the bar does not by it-
self qualify a lawyer to provide effective representation to an indi-
gent defendant. The role of the young lawyer recently admitted to
the bar or of the capable real estate or corporation lawyer, who is
unfamiliar with criminal practice, should be limited to that of as-
32 For an exposition of the problems facing a public defender see Lewis v. Hen-
derson, 381 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1967).
33 DEFENSE OF THE POOR, supra note 22; EQUAL JusrcE, supra note 23.
34 See DFFNsE OF THE POOR at 17.
35 But see United States ex. rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1950) holding that membership in the bar is prima fade
evidence of competence.
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sistant counsel appointed with a properly qualified lawyer.80 In
this way, willing but incompetent lawyers (because of unfamiliar.
ity with criminal practice) may be trained in order to take a por-
tion of the burden off their brethren who meet the established
standard of competence.8 7
Somewhere between these two extremes is a minimum bound.
ary line of competence below which an attorney may not fall and
still be considered effective counsel. The applicable standard of
ability connotes the appointment of a lawyer, who is known and
respected by judge and prosecutor, with at least moderate experi-
ence in criminal court.38
Even after the hurdle of appointing counsel who meets the
capability standard is surmounted, there is still another facet of
effective assistance which must be considered. Not only must we
have counsel reasonably likely to render effective assistance, we
must also have counsel rendering reasonably effective assistance.80
In order to determine the effectiveness of counsel's conduct of a
case, the current standard labeling ineffective assistance only that
conduct which shocks the conscience of the court 0 should be sup-
planted by a higher standard, at least that which applies to an at-
torney faced with malpractice in the civil courts.
The civil standard is variously stated but is typified by the
statement in Hodges v. Carter,41 that a lawyer
is answerable in damages for any loss to his client which proxi-
mately results from a want of that degree of knowledge and
skill ordinarily possessed by others of his profession similarly
situated, or from the omission to use reasonable care and dili-
gence, or from failure to exercise in good faith his best judg-
ment in attending to the litigation committed to his care.42
If it is not necessary for the jury's conscience to be shocked to award
damages where an attorney negligently draws a will, how can we
justify such a requirement (i.e., that the conduct of the trial shocks
the reviewing court's conscience) when we are concerned with tak-
ing away a criminal defendant's freedom?
Throughout the proceedings against a criminal defendant, re-
86 See DEmzEsE OF THE PooR at 17-18.
37 Id. at 18.
88 Id.
39 Brooks y. Texas, 381 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1967).
40 See supra notes 5-8 and 13 and accompanying text.
41 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E2d 144 (1954).
42 Id. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 146. See generally Wade, The Attorney's Liability for
Negligence, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENcE 217 (T. Roady & W. Anderson ed. 1960),
[Vol. 29
1968] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 519
gardless of whether they take place before or after trial, the attorney
must function as an active advocate, not merely as amicus curia.43
Without such functioning, all other rules established are meaning-
less. Without such functioning, the adversary system will not be
able to perform its basic purpose of determining the truth."4
Heretofore, the courts, when passing on the problem of ap-
pointed counsel, have dealt primarily with the form or effectiveness
of the appointment of counsel. Guidelines or standards for making
counsel more effective are still woefully lacking, but in light of the
Court's decision in Entsminger, they may be forthcoming in the
near future.
43 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 758 (1967).
44 Tehan v. United States ex. tel Schott, 382 U.S. 406 (1965).
TAXATION-UsE TAXES ON INTERSTATE SALES-MAIL-ORDER FIRMS
FREED FROM COLLECTING USE TAx-National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Rev. of State of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967)-The at-
tempt by states to require foreign corporations to collect use taxes
has been seriously burdening interstate commerce. This was the
conclusion of the United States Supreme Court in National Bellas
Hess, Inc., v. Department of Rev. of State of Ill.,1 which arose un-
der the following facts. National Bellas Hess, Inc., a Delaware cor-
poration, operates a national mail-order house located in Missouri.
The company mails two catalogues a year and several flyers to
a customer list of over five million names. Its only plant is in
Missouri where all orders are accepted and then sent to the cus-
tomers by mail or common carriers. This corporation has no office,
warehouse, distribution point or property in Illinois. It has no
salesmen, or other representatives in Illinois and does not adver-
tise in newspapers, on bill boards or by radio or television in Illi-
nois. It solicits only by mailed catalogues and flyers. The company
sold over two million dollars in merchandise to Illinois residents
over a fifteen month period. The Department of Revenue of the
State of Illinois claimed National Bellas Hess was liable for the
use tax which it should have collected from Illinois residents in
the amount of 75,000 dollars plus a penalty.2 The company was
held liable for the tax in the Illinois courts3 and appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Reversing the state court's decision,
the court held the contacts fell short of the constitutional require-
ment of "some definite link, some minimum connection, between
State and person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax". There-
fore, the tax violated the due process clause and the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution.4
The test used for determining the power of a state to impose
the burden of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales was whether
the out-of-state company had retail outlets, solicitors or property
within the taxing state. The majority, in applying this test, re-
pudiated the view of the dissent that the test should be whether
the out-of-state company was engaged in exploiting the local mar-
ket on a regular, systematic, large-scale basis.5 The criterion for the
1 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.3 (1965).
3 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Rev. of State of Ill., 34 l1.2d 164,
214 N.E.2d 755 (1966).
4 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Rev. of State of Ill., 386 U.S. 753
(1967) [hereinafter referred to as Nationatj.
5 Id. at 765-66.
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majority's test is "physical presence";8 the dissent's test would be
"economic exploitation."
The decision in National stemmed the trend of an ever-wid-
ening tax burden imposed by states on out-of-state sellers.7 Thirty
years of history precedes the Supreme Court's decision in National.
In 1939, the Supreme Court upheld a California statute requiring
an out-of-state seller to collect the use tax on goods shipped into the
state. The out-of-state seller maintained sales agents within the
state.8 Two years later in two cases arising in Iowa, the Supreme
Court upheld Iowa's demand that Sears, Roebuck and Montgom-
ery Ward collect the use tax on catalogue sales to Iowa residents.
Both companies also maintained retail stores in the state.9 In
1944, the Supreme Court in General Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n' ° upheld the Iowa statute against the challenge of an out-
of-state mail order company which sent traveling salesmen into the
state to solicit orders. In Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland,1 1 the
next important case, a Delaware furniture store had many Maryland
customers who were advised of its wares through advertising in
Delaware newspapers which circulated in Maryland and through
flyers sent to Maryland customers. Miller Brothers took no mail or
phone orders. Maryland customers made their purchases in Dela-
ware, and Miller Brothers occasionally delivered the furniture to
Maryland in its own trucks. In a five-four decision, the Supreme
Court held that Maryland could not make Miller Brothers collect
the Maryland use tax from Maryland customers because there was
not a sufficient nexus between Maryland and the Delaware store.
The four dissenting justices thought that advertising coupled with
delivery was sufficient contact to sustain a duty to collect the use
tax. In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,12 the most recent case, a Georgia
6 This test announced in National represents a precise standard for the tradi.
tional "minimum connections" test. Prior cases held the minimum connections could
be provided by traveling salesmen, local agents, retail stores and independent brokers,
not by undirected newspaper advertising and occasional delivery of goods. But be-
yond these fundamental principles the status of the law remained unclear until
National.
'7 As of 1965, local salestaxes were imposed by over 2,300 localities. In most
states, the local sales tax is complemented by a use tax. HR. RrX. No. 565, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 872 (1965).
8 Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
9 Nelson v. Montgomery Ward F, Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941). Nelson v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
10 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
11 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
12 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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seller's orders were solicited in Florida by independent contractors
who were neither agents nor employees of the seller. The inde-
pendent contractors had designated territories, worked on commis-
sion and solicited orders for Scripto. The orders were accepted and
shipped from the seller's office in Georgia. The Supreme Court
found the solicitors were "independent contractors" and the com-
pany had no other contact with Florida, yet held against the
taxpayer.
This was the background of National. Highlighting this devel-
opment was the obvious tendency of the Supreme Court to cut down
the immunity afforded by both the due process clause and the com-
merce clause and to extend the area in which a state has jurisdiction
to compel an out-of-state seller to collect its use tax. According to
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck &c Go.' 8, the maintenance of a place of
business such as a store, office, warehouse or display room clearly
established such jurisdiction, even though the sales on which the
use tax was imposed were made independent of the in-state place
of business. General Trading extended this jurisdiction to situa-
tions where there was continuous, routine, solicitation by traveling
salesmen of the seller who maintained no place of business within
the taxing state. Scripto further extended it to a situation where the
solicitation was undertaken by independent wholesalers or jobbers,
although the taxpayer had neither a place of business nor any agents
in the state. The only case in which the Supreme Court refused to
extend this jurisdiction was Miller Brothers, where the Court held
that undirected newspaper advertising and delivery of goods was
not a sufficient nexus to give jurisdiction.
National reversed this definite trend toward expansion of state
taxing power by drawing a line beyond which a state could not go.
As the Court stated:
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax
burdens on National in this case, we would have to repudiate
totally the sharp distinction which [had been drawn] between
mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property
within a State, and those who do no more than communicate
with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part
of a general interstate business. 14
-8 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
14 National, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). Contrary to what the majority seems to
be saying here, prior cases had not made a sharp distinction between mail order
sellers with retail outlets and solicitors within a state, and those who do no more
than communicate with customers in the state by mail or common carrier. Although
the decision in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941), seemed to imply
that the use tax was sustained only because the mail-order company also engaged in
retail selling in the taxing state, the Court in General Trading Co. v. State Tax
[Vol. 29
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The line was drawn at some physical nexus or presence within the
taxing state.
The decision in National is also significant for another reason;
it signalled the return of the commerce clause as a viable issue in
the area of use taxes on interstate sales. With the decision in General
Trading some twenty-three years ago, it became evident that theimmunity imposed by the commerce clause in this area was dwind-
ling. The spread of use taxes was making the interstate commerce
restriction a moot question.' 5 The sellers liability for collection of
the use tax became mainly a question of "jurisdiction", 8 with due
process the only meaningful constitutional issue. But the spread of
use taxes created a new problem for the out-of-state sellers -who were
required to collect the taxes.17 This problem was the additional and
prohibitive costs of complying with numerous use tax statutes
with different rates, exemptions, and record-keeping requirements. s
A substantial burden was being placed on the out-of-state seller
which was not being borne by an intrastate seller. Thus a new as-
pect of the commerce clause issue arose-whether the costs and
mechanics of compliance with the rules of multiple jurisdictions
could be regarded as burdening interstate commerce.
The Court in National recognized this issue.' 9 As Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, said:
And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon
National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), characterized the presence of the retail stores in Nelson
as being "constitutionally irrelevant" to the right of the state to collect its tax. The
question, whether or not foreign corporations engaged only in mail order sales would
be required to collect the use tax was undecided until this decision.
'5 See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commn, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). The
earlier appeal of General Trading was founded on the commerce clause. The decision
of the Supreme Court in General Trading settled the question of taxability of a
seller with salesmen in the State. In the Scripto case, the Court held that the activity
of any selling representative in the State eliminated the tax immunity provided by
the commerce clause.
16 See id. at 338; see Reichman-Crosby Co. v. Stone, 204 Mliss. 122, 155, 37 So.2d
22, 27 (1948).
17 As of 1965, local sales taxes were imposed by over 2,300 localities. In most
States, the local sales tax is complemented by a use tax. H.R. REV. No. 565, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 872 (1965).
IS In 1964 there were seven different rates of sales and use taxes: 2, 2 4, 2 4, 5
3V, 4, and 5%. H.R. RE'. No. 565, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 872, at 611-13, 607.608 (1965).
The State of Washington has recently added an eighth, 4.5%. WAsh. REv. CODE Ax%'.
§ 82.12.020 (Supp. 1967).
19 The issue was extensively argued in the brief for appellant. See generally,
Brief for Appellant at 22, 55, National, 386 US. 753 (1967).
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conduct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary
nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can ev-
ery other state and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout
the Nation with the power to impose sales and use taxes. The
many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and
in administrative and record-keeping requirements could en-
tangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of com-
plicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate
claim to impose 'a fair share of the cost of local government.' 20
[Footnotes omitted.]
Justice Stewart was not alluding to the absence oE due process but
was clearly recognizing a new aspect of the commerce clause issue.
In view of this recognition in National of the commerce clause
issue, the conclusion can only be that the "physical presence" test is
not solely a due process test, but a test which takes into considera-
tion the restrictions of both the due process and commerce clauses.
Support for this conclusion can be gathered from a reading of the
text of the decision. Justice Stewart recognized only one applicable
test fof determining the power of a state to impose the burdens
of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales, the "minimum connec-
tions" test. But, while recognizing only one applicable test, Justice
Stewart pointed out at the beginning of the opinion that National
Bellas Hess was claiming a violation of both the due process and
commerce clauses. Justice Stewart characterized this as a constitu-
tional test, not simply a due process or a commerce clause test.21
Justice Stewart's statements indicate the "physical presence" test
will be determinative of whether there is a violation of due process
or an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Clearly, the "physical presence" test is not merely a due pro-
cess test. Requiring physical presence before jurisdiction attaches
is unjustifiable as explained by the Court's opinion in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co.22
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresi-
dents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transfor-
mation of our national economy over the years. Today, many
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may in-
20 National, 386 U.S. 758, 759-60 (1960).
21 In the Miller case, on the contrary, the Court characterized the "ninitnum
connections" test as solely a "due process" -test. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 340, 844-45 (1954).
22 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
[Vol. 29
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
volve parties separated by the full continent. With this increas-
ing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in
the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At
the same time modem transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend him-
self in a state where he engages in economic activity.
If the majority's "physical presence" test merely relates to due pro-
cess then the dissent in National had a valid point when it con-
cluded that the large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and
exploitation of the Illinois consumer market by National Bellas
Hess provides a sufficient "nexus" to require it to collect the use
tax.23 Contemporary advertising techniques justify a jurisdictional
basis less restrictive than physical presence.
Treating "physical presence" as a due process test alone is
unrealistic. But when the restrictions of the commerce clause are
considered the test works admirably toward solving the compli-
cated problems present in the area of use taxes on interstate sales.
Although the realities of contemporary advertising techniques call
for an increase in the power of the states to make out-of-state sellers
collect their use taxes, the ever-increasing burden being placed on
these out-of-state sellers has adversely affected interstate commerce. 2'
The line drawn by the "physical presence" test represents a balance
between these conflicting interests. The "physical presence" test
will tend to reduce the number of states for which any given out-
of-state seller must collect taxes, thereby reducing the costs of com-
pliance for out-of-state sellers. Those out-of-state sellers who do
business in a multitude of states, although not physically present in
the states, will be immune from the necessity of collecting taxes.
But those out-of-state sellers who have property, salesmen or agents
in the taxing state will still be required to collect the use tax. The
"physical presence" test is conclusive evidence that commerce clause
considerations have once again entered the area of use taxes on
interstate sales.
23 National, 386 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1967).
24 The prevailing system requires (the seller) to administer rules which
differ from one State to another and whose application-especially for the
industrial retailer--turns on -facts which are often too remote and uncertain
for the level of accuracy demanded by the prescribed system.
F.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sen. 872 at 673 (1965).
Given the broad spread of sales of even small and moderate sized com-
panies, it is clear that if just the localities which now impose the tMx were
to realize anything like their potential of out-of-state registrants the record-
keeping task of multistate sellers would be clearly intolerable.
MI-.R. RE. No. 565, 89th Cong., ist Ses. 872, at 882. (1965).
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The Supreme Court has not been the only governmental branch
which has recognized that the costs and mechanics of compliance
with the rules of multiple jurisdictions could be burdening inter-
state commerce. In 1959, Congress passed legislation creating a
House Special Sub-Committee On State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce. 25 After the decision in Scripto, which further expanded
the power of the states to impose use taxes on out-of-state sellers,
the Committee study was expanded to include sales and use taxes.
The Committee concluded that state taxation of multi-state busi-
ness operations had become so burdensome that the "common
market" of our fifty-state federation had been seriously threatened.20
Congressional action was inevitable.
The Interstate Tax Act 27 is a bill designed to foster commerce
among the states by providing for systematic regulation of taxation
of interstate commerce. The section of the bill dealing with state
sales and use taxes primarily addresses itself to abuses resulting from
the many variations in taxes and collecting criteria in the various
states. In addition, the bill is concerned with the failure of states
to provide an off-set credit provision to eliminate possible multiple
taxation. The bill establishes a uniform jurisdictional standard for
state or local taxation. In regard to use taxes, it provides that no
state or political subdivision thereof shall have the power to require
a person to collect a sales or use tax with respect to a sale of tangible
personal property unless, (1) the person has a business location in
the state, or (2) the person regularly makes household deliveries in
the state.28 The bill defines "having a business location in the state"
as (1) owning or leasing real property within the state, (2) having
one or more employees located in the state, or (3) regularly main-
taining a stock of tangible personal property in the state for sale
in the ordinary course of business. 29 The bill further provides that
an employee shall not be considered to be located in a state if his
only business activities within such state on behalf of his employers
are (1) the solicitation of orders which are sent outside the state
for approval or rejection and filled by shipment or delivery from a
point outside the state, or (2) the solicitation of orders in the name
of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of his employer.80
25 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959).
26 See H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 872 (1965): H.R. REX,. No. 2013,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965).
27 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
28 Id. § 101.
20 Id. § 511.
80 Id. § 513 (d).
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The foregoing jurisdictional standards in the bill are nothing
more than different manisfestations of the "physical presence" test
announced in National. They too will tend to reduce the number
of states for which any given out-of-state seller must collect use
taxes, thereby reducing such seller's tax burden and freeing inter-
state commerce. The bill also supports the holding in National
in that an out-of-state mail-order firm not physically present in the
taxing state would be immune from taxation. However, it would
negate the result of the Court's decision in General Tradinga' and
Scripto32 because under its provisions out-of-state sellers who solicit
orders through employee salesmen or independent sales representa-
tives are expressly exempted from collecting out-of-state use taxes.33
The National case indicates the Court's approval of a bill like
the Interstate Tax Act both practically and constitutionally. 'Fhe
majority in National was emphatic in warning of the dangers to
the free play of interstate commerce that would result if National
Bellas Hess was required to collect use taxes for every jurisdiction
into which its goods were shipped. Furthermore, the court notes
that Congress has evidenced interest in this area and that it favors
such congressional action.34 The conclusion can only be that the
majority in National was paving the way for congressional entrance
into the area.
Prior congressional action also supports the constitutionality
of the Interstate Tax Act. In 1959, Congress enacted the Interstate
Income Law3 5 which forbade the states to levy an income tax on a
foreign corporation whose only jurisdictional contact with the state
was the solicitation of interstate orders by traveling salesmen.30 Con-
gress was attempting to protect foreign corporations engaged in
interstate commerce from state income taxes which it believed
were excessive and unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
31 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
32 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
33 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., § 513 (d) (1967).
34 National, 386 U.S. at 760 n. 15 (1967).
35 15 U.S.C. §381 (1964). This legislation represents Congress' reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1959), which held net income from exclusively interstate operations or
a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation, provided the levy is
not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing
state forming sufficient nexus to support the same.
36 The jurisdictional standards used in the Interstate Income Law are identical
to those proposed in the Interstate Tax Act.
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Ii three cases", highe t, tate'courts have 'upheld the Intersiate In-
c6me Law against allegatiohs that Congress lacked ppo#r under thd
commerce: clause to 'forbid such' taxation. In one case the! cdutt
stated tle motive and purpose of the regulation of interstate coma
mefee ar'lmatters of unrestricted legislative judgment over which
the courts-are given 'no control. 38 In another case the court traced
the judicial history of the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, citing numerous instances Where the Supreme Court
had specifically recognized that this power extends into the area
of state and local taxation, ' and 'concluded that the Interstate In-
come Law was a proper exercise of Congress' constitutional author-
ity.39
These arguments supporting the constitutional validity of the
Interstate, Income Law are sufficiently' broad to support the con-
stitutional validity of the Interstate Tax Act. If the Interstate In-
come Law is constitutional, it would appear that the restrictive reg-
ulations imposed by the Interstate Tax Act would also be constitu-
tionally sound.40
Prospects for passage of the bill seem fair, since this is the first
time that such a' bill has reached the point of being reported out
of committee.41 But there has been considerable state opposition to
federal legislation in this area. The decision in National and the
congressional attempt to legislate in the area of use taxes on inter-
state sales are commendable. The existing multi-state system of
taxation is so complex, confusing, unfair, and intolerable that uni-
form legislation is necessary to preserve the common market of our
Nation.
37 International Shoe Company v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So.2d 314, cert. de-
nied, 379 US. 902 (1964); Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n,
241 Or. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965); State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v,
State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1964).
38 See State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n,
382 S.D.2d 645, 657 (Mo. Sup. Ct., 1964).
39 International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 258, 164 So.2d 314, 319 (1964).
40 The Supreme Court has not yet affirmatively ruled on the constitutionality of
the Interstate Income Law, denying certiorari in the International Shoe Co. case.
41 Two bills preceded the present bill, H.R. 11798 and H.R. 16491, but neither
was reported out of committee.
[Vol. 2 0
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LABOR-SUBSANTAL EVIDENCE RULE As APPLIED TO EMPLOYER
FREE, SpEEcH' CAsE--NLRB v. Hobart Bros Co., 372 F.2d 203 (6th
Cir. 1967)-During a unioni organizational campaign at Hobart
Brothers Company the Union sent authorization cards to approxi-
mately one-half of Hobart's employees, pledging that the 'cards
would be treated confidentially. President Hobart sent a letter
to all of his employees shortly thereafter informing them that the
cards would not be-confidential, and advising his employees not to
sign anything without first considering the consequences. The
NLR.B2 adopted the findings of the Trial Examiner that the letter
amounted to a threat of reprisal for union activity in violation of
section 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations AcL 3 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the Board, stating that the
Board's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, look-
ing at the record as a whole.
Hobart Brothers is a leading manufacturer of welding equip-
ment and is located in Troy, Ohio. The Union sent the authori-
zation cards to 300-350 employees of Hobart in hopes of getting
enough signatures to convince the NLRB that an election was
desired. President Hobart's letter, written to all 600 employees,
began by reminding the employees of the benefits they had received
without a union and advising them that several of their benefits
had been increased. The letter concluded with the following para-
graph, which is the basis of the dispute:
Don't be fooled into signing misleading cards that are mailed in
secrecy. It is said that when you sign such a card, no one other
than a Union Representative or a representative of the National
Labor Relations Board will ever see this card. This is not the
truth. In many cases the signed card is disclosed to the company
by the Union, the N.L.R.B., or both of them. Be careful about
what you sign-don't sign ANYTHING unless you KNOW what
you are signing and what it might mean to you, your family,
or your fellow employees.
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act makes it unlawful for employers to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce their employees in the exercise of
their guaranteed rights. A threat is deemed to be coercion and is
not protected by either the Act or the First Amendment of the
Constitution.4 No proof of coercive intent or effect is necessary to
1 Int'l Union, UAW.
2 Hobart Bros. and Int'l Union, UAIV. 150 N.L.R.B. 956 (1965).
3 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 US.C.
§ 158 (a) (1) (1964).
4 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, (1941).
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establish an unfair labor practice under 8 (a) (1); it is only neces-
sary to find that the speech or letter can be reasonably interpreted
as a threat.5 So the Board must determine if the letter or speech
contains a threat; if there is no threat, section 8 (c) of the Act tells
the Board there is no unfair labor practice.
A divided court of appeals reversed the Trial Examiner and the
Board. The majority held that the Company had only exercised its
right to refute a false assertion by the Union that the cards would
be kept secret. As far as the warning was concerned, the court
felt it was not proper for the Board to infer that the Company was
threatening any illegal reprisals. President Hobart may have been
only reminding his employees of the drawbacks that accompany
union membership, including dues, union political squabbles, and
strikes. 6
Judge Edwards wrote a vigorous dissent to the court's opinion.
He noted that the letter was sent immediately after the authoriza-
tion cards were distributed and while the employees were making
an important decision about union representation. Further, the
letter was signed by the company President and it stated that he
would learn who signed the cards. There was no union in the
plant at the time and therefore management had complete power
of discharge of any employee at any time for any reason. There
was no assurance that reprisals would not be made against those
persons who did sign the cards. Judge Edwards believed if all
these circumstances were considered there could be no doubt that
the letter was a threat, and the court was exercising unwarranted
de novo review to upset a reasonable determination of the Board.
The Wagner Act section 10 (e) provided: "The findings of
the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be con-
clusive."8 The courts of appeal had interpreted this section as
requiring that they review the Board's decisions on factual issues,
but some of these courts exercised a limited form of review. Under
this narrow review, they would look at one side of the evidence and
if testimony was found to support the Board's finding, the courts
would affirm the decision, no matter how discredited or contradicted
5 Time-O-Matic v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959) ; NLRB v. Illinois Tool
Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1946).
6 NLRB v. Hobart Bros. Co., 372 F.2d 203, 205 (6th Cir. 1967).
7 Id. at 207.
8 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 454
(1935).
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the supporting evidence had been.9 In 1947 the National Labor
Relations Act was amended to read: "The findings of the Board
with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive."' 0
In Universal Camera v. NLR.B" the Supreme Court announced
that Congress, in amending section 10 (e), intended to prohibit the
courts of appeal from continuing their practice of exercising
a one-sided form of judicial review. The Court said the whole case
must be considered and the Board's finding must be supported by
substantial evidence. Justice Frankfurter went on to say that no
drastic reversal of policy was intended, only a compromise between
rubber stamping and de novo review of Board decisions was sought.
The rule was not:
[intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one
of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experi-
ence to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose find-
ings within that field carry the authority of expertness which
courts do not possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it
mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court
may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the Court would justifiably have made a
different choice had the matter been before it de 11ovo. 22
Justice Frankfurter realized that the courts of appeal might
have difficulty in applying the elusive rule of Universal Camera
with any degree of precision. But he hoped they could at least
grasp the spirit of the rule,' 8 which is this: if there is conflicting
evidence as to the existence or nonexistence of a certain fact, the
Board is free to decide whether the fact exists, so long as there is
substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support that con-
clusion. Once the existence or nonexistence of the fact is established
by the record, the Board is free to draw any inferences from that
conclusion so long as the inferences are reasonable. 4
If the rule of Universal Camera is applied to the Hobart case,
it becomes apparent that the Sixth Circuit missed the spirit of the
9 See NLRB v. Columbia Products Corp., 141 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1944): Wilson
SL Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1942). When the committee reported on the
§ 10(e) amendment, it was critical of the Supreme Courts treatment of the old 10(c).
See, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947).
10 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1964).
11 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US. 474 (1951).
12 Id. at 488.
13 Id. at 489.
14 See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 US. 17, 50 (1954); NLRB v. Marsh
Supermarkets, 327 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 944 (1964).
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rule. None of the facts are in dispute, so the only question under
the substantial evidence rule is whether the Board's inference that
the letter contained a threat is reasonable. The court states that it
is not exercising de novo review but looking to the record as a
whole in an attempt to discover if the Board's finding is supported
by substantial evidence. 15 Closer examination of the opinion re-
veals several discrepancies. The court states that:
The Trial Examiner was correct only in finding that the letter
was calculated to convey to the employees that their signing of
the union cards would not be kept secret and that the company
would probably learn about their signing the cards. He was
incorrect in finding that the respondent would engage in re-
prisals against them if they signed the union cards.1 6 (Emphasis
added.)
According to Unive'sal Camera, Congress did not instruct the courts
of appeal to determine whether the Trial Examiner was correct.
It merely told the courts to determine whether the Board's decision
was supported by the evidence, even though the court might have
come to a different conclusion if it were reviewing the case de
novo.17 The court proclaims, "We cannot say from the record
in this case that the company had no legitimate purpose in urging
its employees to be careful before signing a card." 18 Instead, the
court should have been asking itself whether the Board rTa'onably
inferred that' the' letter was a threat. Next the court remarks, "In
this case, whefr the only question is whether or not' the letter
contained a threat within the meaning of the- Act, the Court
should be free to'reject an improper inference drawn by' the Board
.... -' "Again the court is displaying a basic misunderstanding of
the substantial evidence rule. The Board, by statute, is charged with
the responsibility of determining whether the letter contained a
threat. The question for the court is not whether the letter contained
a threat but whether the Board's characterization of the letter as a
threat is reasonable in light of the facts. Next it is stated that "The
construction of a writing is not the special expertise of the Board.
Rather, it is for the Courts which have more experience and com-
petence in construing and interpreting written instruments."20
15 372 F.2d at 207.
16 Id. at 204.
17 340 U.S. at 488.
18 372 F.2d at 206.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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When the writing involves labor relations, contrary to the court's
opinion, Congress has indicated that it believes the Board gener-
ally has more expertise in interpreting it and in deciding the best
policy to pursue with regard to it. The Board must deal with
dozens if not hundreds of communications every year between
employers and employees concerning union activities. The Board
is familiar with the many techniques employers use to threaten
employees and with how the employees react to these techniques. 21
Assuming the Board is not as adept at interpreting writings as the
court, Justice Frankfurter clearly states in Universal Camera that
even as to matters not requiring expertise the court must respect
the Board's opinion, so long as it is supported by substantial evi-
dence.22 The Sixth Circuit purported to be applying the substantial
evidence rule in Hobart, but it failed to do so.
The Hobart case, and others like it, have caused a great
deal of confusion in the courts of appeal. The Sixth Circuit has
'followed the substantial evidence rule in its entirety,23 has recited
the dialogue of Universal Camera without applying its rule,- 4
and has simply declared that the Board's finding of a threat was
erroneous, without referring to the substantial evidence rule or any
other rule for support.25 PArt of the trouble arises because courts
are not willing to abdicate their responsibility for protecting speech
to an administrative agency,' and part of the trouble arises because
the substantial evidence rule inherently tends to create confusion.
The irony is that Congress has also seen the danger of giving
the Board sudh complete control over speech, and in 1947 passed
section 8 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act in an effort to
limit that power.26 This section designates "threats" as a legal
issue, and thereby gives the courts of appeal the power of de novo
21 For a discussion concerning the problems invoved in determining wh2t effect
a given speech or letter will have in influendng an election, see, Bok. The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under The National Labor Relations
Act, 78 HAv. L. REv. 38, 74 (1964).
22 84 U.S. at 488.
23 See NLRB v. Superex Drugs, 341 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Kings-
ford, 313 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1963).
24 The Hobart case aptly demonstrates this point.
25 See Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1962).
26 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1964) whichi says:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not consti-
tute, or be evidence of an unfair practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.
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review over the Board. If the speech or letter does not contain a
threat of force or reprisal, it is not an unfair practice and cannot
even be used as evidence of an unfair practice.
Support for this theory can be found in the committee reports
of the 80th Congress. The House committee reporting on the pro-
posed amendment stated that the Board, by inferring threats, was
using against people what the Constitution allows them to say freely.
The committee went on to report that section 8 (c) corrects that
situation by requiring that the speech, by its own terms, and standing
alone, must be a threat.27
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will interpret section
8 (c) as requiring that the threat be included in the speech or
letter before a violation of the Act may be found. In a footnote
to NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the Court explained that it was
not going to use a letter from Exchange Parts to its employees as
evidence of an unfair practice, since the letter itself contained no
express threat, although the Court did admit that the "inference [of
economic reprisal] was made almost explicit in [the] letter."28 Prior
to the section 8 (c) amendment, the Supreme Court had ruled that
the Board must review all past conduct and speech in determining
if the employer had engaged in unlawful coercion.2 9
The soundness of the section 8 (c) argument can be seen by
drawing an analogy to section 10 (c) of the Act. 0 That section pro-
vides that a person discharged for "cause" shall not be entitled
to reinstatement or back pay. The Supreme Court has interpreted
section 10 (c) as creating two separate questions. The Board must
determine the factual issue of why the person was discharged. After
this first question is answered, the legal question oE "cause" arises. 81
Th Board must answer this legal question in the first instance, but
its decision is subject to de novo review by the courts. Likewise,
under section 8 (c) the Board in the first instance should determine
as a matter of fact what was said, and then it should decide as a
matter of law whether the words contain a threat. The Board's
27 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947). Contra, S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947). The Senate report stated that the Board could
imply threats. However, it should be noted that the Senate version of § 8 (c) had in-
cluded the words "express or implied" threats and that these words were omitted in
the version that was ultimately adopted, with only the word "contain" being used.
S. REP. No. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (c) (1947).
28 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
29 See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
30 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1964).
31 See NLRB v. Local 1299, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953).
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decision on the first question is subject to judicial review, but only
under Universal Camera standards. The Board's decision on the
second question is one of law so it is subject to de novo review by
the courts.
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Hobart can be justified
under the above view of section 8 (c). President Hobart informed
his employees that they should not sign anything until they
were sure what it might mean to themselves, their families, and
their fellow employees. Words can only be understood in their
context, so it is relevant to consider that preceding this sentence,
the employer told his employees not to be misled into signing cards
that are mailed in secrecy. Hobart said the company would discover
who signed the cards. Two phrases can be considered meaningless in
his letter; thus they must be defined by reference to the surrounding
circumstances. "It is said that when you sign such a card no one
other than a Union Representative or a representative of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board will ever see this card." What card
is Hobart referring to, and who said it would be kept secret? The
Board must answer these factual questions. In making these factual
determinations, the Board would add nothing to the letter that
would not already be there, and it would not be inferring that a
threat exists. The board would merely attempt to define a mean-
ingless word or phrase that the employer incorporated into his
letter. These sterile words are not susceptible of two or more
meanings; they are completely meaningless until the Board ascribes
some meaning to them. In the Hobart case, the Board determined
the cards were union authorization cards and the organizing union
had claimed they would be kept secret. So long as this finding is
supported by substantial evidence it should not be disturbed. With
no factual issues and no inferences to be drawn, there is nothing
left but a legal issue-i.e., are these words a threat within the
meaning of the Act? In the Hobart case the letter has no clear mean-
ing. This is not because it is sterile and in need of definition by in-
corporation, but rather the letter is ambiguous or susceptible of
two or more reasonable interpretations. Hobart may have been
informing his employees that he would take economic reprisals
against them if they voted for the union. It is equally reasonable
to interpret his speech as being a mere warning to the employees
about the undesirable consequences that accompany union mem-
bership, such as dues, strikes, and political squabbles. The Board
may select their interpretation, but the decision is a conclusion
of law and is subject to de novo review by the court on appeal.
Judge Edwards, dissenting, believed the following to be par-
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ticularly relevant: there was no union in the plant, management
had complete power of discharge, and there was no assurance this
power would not be used against those who signed the cards. When
these factors are combined with the words of Hobart, Edwards
argued that there is no doubt that the Board's inference of a threat
is reasonable. But this is clearly against the mandate of Congress.
The speech, standing alone, must contain a threat. It would be
stretching the doctrine of incorporation by reference to say that
Hobart's letter incorporated all of the factors that Judge Edwards
believed relevant to the decision. If the Board or court inferred
that the letter is a threat, then it is not deciding that the letter
itself contained a threat. Rather, it is deciding that what the letter
contained, combined with what is outside the letter, creates a threat
by implication.
To date, the courts of appeals have not used the theory of
section 8 (c) that is outlined above.3 2 The substantial evidence rule
has been, applied to free speech cases, and the Board has been
ppentted to, imply or infer threats, so long as the inference is
reasonable. 83 The few courts that have pondered the meaning of
,8 (q) have concluded that it means nothing at all - that Congress
merely intended to restate the principles embodied in the-First
Amendment.84 But the,,application of the substantial evidence rule
to these cases has caused unwarranted restrictions, on freedom of
expression, If ''threats" were considered a legal issue, there would
be fewer problems: and inconsistencies. First the courts of appeal
would treat the question like any other question of law andwould
exercise their own independent judgment as to the legal signi-
ficance of the words, thus eliminating the, confusion as to the
proper standard of review, Second, the, decisions would provide
a reliable precedent for future cases. The Board and the courts
would not consider past conduct, prior speeches, or any other
f-actual issue of this sort. The, only question would be whether
these" words, standing alone, Icontain a threat. Other employers
would be able to know in advance what they can and cannot
.properly say. When "threats" are implied, as at present, employers
,32 See NLRB v., J.L. 'Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1944), which Intcr-
preted "threats" to be a legal issue, but this case was decided before § 8 (c) was passed.
33 See NLRB v. Superex Drugs, 341 F.2d 747 (6th Cir, 1965); Hendrix MEg.
jCo. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100 (5th Cii. 1963); NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826 (6th
Cir. 1963).
34 See Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB,'310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962);
NLRB v. Bailey Co., 180 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co., 178
F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
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do not know whether the words alone were the real cause of the
violation or whether it was because the particular employer had a
previous National Labor Relations Act violation on his record.
There is no predictability under the substantial evidence rule;
as a result employers refrain from speech that the Constitution says
they can use freely.3 5
Perhaps some will argue that the words used in Hobart do
have a clear meaning and that meaning is threatening. But that
argument misses the problem presented in Hobart and the other
free speech cases. Congress has indicated its intent to deprive the
Board of its power to convict or exonerate Hobart or any other
employer on the basis of his past record. Congress has also demon-
strated its intent to protect speech by requiring that the Board and
the courts must find a threat actually expressed or contained in the
speech itself before they can declare it unlawful. This has been
designated as a legal issue rather than factual. Therefore, the courts
of appeal must make an independent review. If the courts con-
tinue to apply the substantial evidence rule to these free speech
cases, section 8 (c) will be deprived of all meaning, Congress' intent
will be ignored, free speech will be violated, and the hodgepodge
of ad hoc decisions will continue.
35 The vagueness of the present standard restricts speech to such a degree that
it raises first amendment issues. This, however, is beyond the scope of the present
discussion.
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